





• Many items, heterogeneous but similar
• Competing technologies
• Complex structure of substitutes and 
complements
• Government objective: Efficiency





– All lots at the same time
• Ascending
– Can raise bid on any lot
• Stopping rule
– All lots open until no bids on any lot
• Activity rule
– Must be activity to maintain eligibility
Strategy in SAA
Auction as a Negotiation
• Learn what competitors need
• Learn how costly it is to ask for more




• Stake a claim
• Punish intruders
• Use code bids to clarify
Simultaneous ascending auction
• Strengths
– Simple price discovery process
– Allows arbitrage across substitutes
– Piece together desirable packages








– Complex bidding strategies
Limited substitution: US AWS
90 MHz, 161 rounds, $14 billion
US AWS high bids in selected rounds
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Sum of pwb amount per 10 MHz for each block broken down by round.  Color shows details  about pw_bidder.  Size shows details  about license_size_mhz. The view is filtered on pw_bidder and round. The pw_bidder filter excludes . The 








• With complements, bidding on individual 
lots is risky
– Bidder must “go for it” or drop out early
– Outcome is often inefficient
– Experiments sometimes get high revenues










• Clock auction for packages, followed by
• Best-and-final (proxy) round
Package clock auction
• Auctioneer names prices; bidders name 
only quantities
– Price adjusted according to excess demand
– Process repeated until market clears
• No exposure problem (package auction)
• Activity rule to promote price discovery
• Final round to fine-tune assignment
UK 
spectrum auctions
UK 2.6 GHz auction proposal
• 190 MHz (38 lots of 5 MHz)
– Compare US AWS, 90 MHz, $14 billion
• How much paired vs. unpaired?
Let auction determine band plan
3 paired winners; 3 unpaired
Key design choices
• Generic 5 MHz lots
– Lots are perfect substitutes
• Package bids
– No exposure problem
• Clock stage
– How many paired? How many unpaired? Supply = 38
– Continue until no excess demand
• Activity rule
– Demands for paired and unpaired cannot increase
• Best-and-final bids
– Demand (p,u) = (p paired lots, u unpaired lots)
– When drop below (p,u), give best bid for (p,u) lots
• Best-and-final round
– Find value maximizing generic assignment 
• Assignment stage
– Require contiguous spectrum if possible
– Top-up bid to determine specific assignment
Information policy in clock stage
• Anonymous: Aggregate demands reported
• Transparent: All demands reported
• Anonymous is simplest for bidders
– Focus on what is most important
• Transparent is best if bidders have “need 
to know”
– For example, need to know likely winners to 
estimate value
Pricing rule
• In clock stage? In assignment stage?
• Pay-as-bid pricing
– Incentives for demand reduction, bid shading
• Bidder-optimal core pricing
– Stronger incentives for truthful bidding
Bidder-optimal core pricing
• Minimize payments subject to core 
constraints
• Core = assignment and payments
such that
– Efficient: Value maximizing assignment
– Unblocked: No subset of bidders prefers to 
offer seller a better deal
Optimization
• Core point that minimizes payments 
readily calculated
• Use constraint generation method: find 
most violated core constraint and add it
(Day and Raghavan 2005)
• Tie-breaking rule for prices is important
– Minimize square deviation from Vickrey prices
Why core pricing?
• Truthful bidding nearly optimal
– Simplifies bidding
– Improves efficiency
• Same as Vickrey if Vickrey in core 
(substitutes)
• Avoids Vickrey problems with compliments
– Prices that are too low
• Revenue is monotonic in bids and bidders
• Minimizes incentive to distort bids
Where do we see core pricing?
• Core methods have a long history in 
matching
– Match interns to hospitals
– Match students to schools
• Core methods in auctions are much more 
recent
– Auctioning many items with complements
– All standard auctions find point in core
10-40 GHz Auction








A: 10 GHz national 10 2 x 10 MHz 1 £10,000
B: 28 GHz national 2 2 x 112 MHz 6 £60,000
C: 28 GHz sub-region 1 1 2 x 112 MHz 2 £20,000
D: 28 GHz sub-region 2 1 2 x 112 MHz 1 £10,000
E: 28 GHz sub-region 3 1 2 x 112 MHz 3 £30,000
F: 32 GHz national 6 2 x 126 MHz 6 £60,000
G: 40GHz national 6 2 x 250 MHz 3 £30,000
Package clock auction
• Principal stage
– Primary rounds (clock auction)
– Supplementary bids
– Optimization: Winners and base prices
• Assignment stage
– Assignment bids
– Optimization: Specific assignments and 
additional payments
Activity rule
• Whenever reduce package size, value on all 
larger packages limited by prices at the time of 
reduction
– Example
• Bidder drops from package of size 40 to 36 at prices p
• For all packages x of size 37 to 40,
bid ≤ p ⋅ x
• Implication
– Profit maximization is poor strategy
– Bid to maximize package size subject to profit ≥ 0
Full-scale test of design
(Maryland PhD students)
• Experienced subjects
– Course in advanced game theory
– Prior participation in package clock auction
• Motivated subjects
– Average subject payment = $400
• Realistic scenarios
• 4 mock auctions with moderate competition
(6 bidders)
• 8 mock auctions with weak competition
(4 bidders)
Six bidder auctions
• Deviation from truth is caused by activity 
rule, not strategic behavior
• Activity rule
– Destroys price discovery
– Undermines efficiency
Mock Truth Value Efficiency Profit Share
6a.1 93% 5,782 93% 2,706 43%
6a.2 97% 5,540 89% 3,755 60%
6a.all 100% 6,248 100% 2,646 42%
6b.1 96% 4,176 93% 1,751 39%
6b.2 100% 4,303 96% 1,147 26%
6b.all 100% 4,494 100% 1,101 25%
Truth = average of bid/value; Share = profit/value.
Mock *.all includes all bids (about 50,000) at value.
Four bidder auctions
• Activity rule destroys price discovery
Mock Truth Value Efficiency Profit Share
4a.1 100% 2,858 96% 1,446 49%
4a.2 100% 2,859 96% 1,698 57%
4a.3 100% 2,880 97% 1,296 44%
4a.4 100% 2,970 100% 1,370 46%
4a.all 100% 2,978 100% 976 33%
4b.1 100% 1,865 99% 1,033 55%
4b.2 100% 1,590 84% 410 22%
4b.3* 100% 1,891 100% 1,054 56%
4b.4 100% 1,819 97% 1,016 54%
4b.all 100% 1,882 100% 879 47%
Truth = average of bid/value; Share = profit/value.
Mock *.all includes all bids (about 34,000) at value.
* White's package violates minimum size constraint.
Activity rule is readily fixed
• Revealed-preference activity rule
– Compare times s and t (s < t), 
Prices: ps, pt Demands: xs, xt
– At time s, xs is better than xt:
– At time t, xt is better than xs :
• Adding inequalities yields the RP activity rule:
( ) ( )s s s t s tv x p x v x p x− ⋅ ≥ − ⋅
( ) ( )t t t s t sv x p x v x p x− ⋅ ≥ − ⋅
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 .t s t sRP p p x x− ⋅ − ≤
Revealed preference for 
supplementary bids
• For each package T in clock stage, 
provide a value v(T), consistent with 
revealed preference
• For each supplementary package S, 
provide a value V(S) consistent with 
revealed preference:
v(S) – Pt(S) ≤ v(T) – Pt(T)
(T was more profitable than S at time t)
Evaluation from test
• Activity rule destroys price discovery




• Simple for bidders
• Competitive revenues
• Simple for the auctioneer
Conclusion




– Allows auction to determine band plan
– Readily customized to a variety of settings
